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COMMENT ON "THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE: A
STRUCTURAL OVERVIEW AND AN APPRAISAL OF
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS"
BARRY

A. FISHER*

Dean Choper identifies two main themes: first, that the Supreme
Court has interpreted the free exercise clause "to provide a virtually unique protection for religion," and second, that under the decisions of the Burger Court, this protection has been held to be
"markedly greater than the security that the Constitution provides
for speech."' I do not find it surprising that the Supreme Court
has found that religion is entitled to unique protection; I think
that the conclusion is embedded in the structure of the Constitution and of the first amendment in particular. I believe, though,
that it is a mistake to try to measure degrees of protection for
speech and religion on the same thermometer. Religion is different.
At the same time as he acknowledges recent defeats for the proponents of free exercise claims such as United States v. Lee' and
Bob Jones University v. United States,3 Dean Choper portrays the
free exercise clause as, in the Supreme Court's hands, something of
a talisman in the face of which weighty governmental interests are
routinely made to disappear. 4 He suggests, in particular, that the
* Fisher & Moest, Los Angeles, California. The writer wishes to thank his colleagues
David Grosz, Robert C. Moest, and William M. Kramer for their invaluable assistance in the
preparation of this Comment.
1. Choper, The Free Exercise Clause: A Structural Overview and an Appraisalof Recent
Developments, 27 WM.& MARY L. REV. 943, 943 (1986).
2. 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
3. 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
4. To the ranks now may be added Goldman v. Weinberger, 106 S. Ct. 1310 (1986), in
which the Court held that a psychologist in the Air Force who was an Orthodox Jew and an
ordained rabbi could not wear his yarmulke inside the mental health clinic where he worked
in the face of a regulation generally prohibiting the wearing of headgear indoors. For the
five-vote majority, Justice Rehnquist wrote that the obviously strong free exercise interest
could not prevail as against the Air Force's view that "such practices ...would detract from
the uniformity sought by the dress regulations." Id. at 1314. I could not agree more with
Dean Choper that, under usual free exercise jurisprudence, the case should have gone the
other way. As Justice Brennan remarked, when it comes to claims of military convenience or
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free exercise clause possesses far greater magical powers in this regard than does the free speech clause. Inviting us to join him at
ringside, he eagerly accepts sucker bets from anyone foolish
enough to favor speech in a bout with religion in the arena at First
and East Capitol Streets.
The reality is not so simple. Instead of Louis versus Palooka, the
religion and speech clauses emerge from the Supreme Court's cases
as partners in a kind of odd minuet, which, for reasons that remain
obscure, find themselves now face-to-face, now out of each other's
sight, now stumbling over each other's feet.
Take first the cases in which the free exercise claimants won not
on religious grounds per se but precisely because application of the
governmental regulations at issue were said to violate their speech
rights. I refer to West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette5 and Wooley v. Maynard,' which Dean Choper mentions in a
somewhat different context.7
The plaintiffs in both Barnette and Wooley were Jehovah's Witnesses who contended that certain state regulations-requiring, respectively, school children to salute the flag and motorists to display New Hampshire's "Live Free or Die" motto on their license
plates-violated sincerely held and deeply felt religious beliefs.
Yet, as Dean Choper observes, the Court in both cases "did not
rest on the free exercise clause, but rather on the broader first
amendment protection of freedom of expression." 8
necessity, "[u]nabashed ipse dixit cannot outweigh a constitutional right." Id. at 1317-18
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
5. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
6. 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
7. I am a bit surprised, for I thought it had long since been discredited, to see the
credence Dean Choper gives to the famous dictum in Cantwell "distinguish[ing] between
'freedom to believe and freedom to act.'" Choper, supra note 1, at 943. For religious beliefs-or any other kind of beliefs-to be regulated directly verges on the impossible. The
Barnette and Wooley decisions cited by Dean Choper certainly do not demonstrate otherwise, for, in those cases, the state regulated action. Neither West Virginia nor New Hampshire had a law telling the Jehovah's Witnesses what they could or could not believe. Nearly
every regulation dealt with by the Court that has implicated the free exercise clause had
affected action in one form or another.
The "belief-action" distinction does survive as a legal artifact, if not a legal fact. Its principal function these days seems to be that of a verbal crutch hauled out by government
lawyers-and, sometimes, even by courts-seeking desperately to support what looks like an
utterly unsupportable regulation.
8. Id. at 944 (emphasis added).
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Not only that, but it is by no means clear that the plaintiffs
would have done as well under a free exercise theory alone. Although Barnette was argued on the free exercise clause and on a
free speech basis, 9 its predecessor, Minersville School District v.
Gobitis,10 in which the Court reached the opposite result, was argued exclusively on the free exercise clause."' The political atmosphere in 1943, when Barnette was decided, might have militated
strongly against the Court's giving a preferred position to the Jehovah's Witnesses, whose religion widely was perceived as unpatriotic. For Justice Frankfurter in Gobitis, the question was whether
the legislature had the right to make the judgment that school discipline would be too drastically undermined if, "though the ceremony may be required, exceptional immunity must be given to dissidents.' 2 Justice Jackson's answer in Barnette was to avoid
entirely that unpalatable inquiry by holding that its premise-that
the flag salute could in general be required-was fatally flawed. To
ground the decision on a free speech basis-courageous enough in
itself, to be sure-may have been seen as a substantially less dangerous course than to accept the Witnesses' claim of religious exemption for themselves alone. The Barnette pattern is not
unique. 13
Dean Choper points out four apparent votes against the proposition that a religious injunction against "graven images" entitles the
believer to a driver's license sans photograph. 4 In Wooley, May9. 319 U.S. at 630.
10. 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
11. See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 635.
12. 310 U.S. at 599-600.
13. Free speech cases reaching as far back as Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938),
involved religiously compelled acts that could have been treated under a free exercise
analysis.
14. See Choper, supra note 1, at 955 (discussing Quaring v. Peterson, 728 F.2d 1121 (8th
Cir. 1984), aff'd by an equally divided Court per curiam sub nom. Jensen v. Quaring, 472
U.S. 478 (1985)). In Bowen v. Roy, 106 S. Ct. 2147 (1986), three justices, including Chief
Justice Burger, who had authored what then seemed the rather routine majority opinion in
Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981), seemed willfully to narrow the scope of
Thomas. The three justices concluded that a "requirement for a government benefit" that is
contrary to sincerely held religious beliefs is nevertheless valid as against the believer if it is
simply "neutral and uniform in its application" and can be said to be "a reasonable means
of promoting a legitimate public interest." 106 S. Ct. at 2156 (opinion of Burger, C.J., joined
by Powell & Rehnquist, JJ.). Thomas had to be distinguished on a ground taken not from
the rationale of the decision but, assertedly, from the briefs in that case. Although Chief
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nard's claim, decided on free speech grounds, received seven
favorable votes. In some cases, therefore, a religion-based claim
may well receive a better judicial reception when clothed in free
speech garb. On the other hand, although the religious context of
Wooley did not enter explicitly into the decision, it may well have
influenced the Court. I wonder how challenges to Maine's "Vacationland" or Minnesota's "10,000 Lakes" license plate slogans
would fare.
In recent years, the Court has made clear the existence of another category of cases: those in which the free speech clause sets a
maximum level of constitutional protection for a particular activity, even if it is carried out as part of a centrally important religious exercise. In Heffron v. International Society for Krishna
Consciousness,Inc.,15 a Hare Krishna group challenged the Minnesota State Fair's rule that required that the distribution of literature and the solicitation of donations take place only from a fixed
location, or "booth."
The Krishna Consciousness religion imposes upon its members
the duty to perform the religious ritual called sankirtan, which involves spreading to as many people as possible the glories of the
Lord, Krishna, and the teachings of his disciples. As practiced in
this country, sankirtan encompasses the distribution of religious
literature and the solicitation of contributions; the latter not only
serves to support the church, but also represents a step, in the view
of the Krishna devotees, toward the spiritual rebirth of the donor.
The affirmative message-spreading nature of sankirtan requires
that the devotees make direct approaches to members of the public,"6 and courts therefore had recognized that it obviously could
not be practiced from a "booth."

Justice Burger's opinion announced the Court's judgment, five justices would have applied a
more traditional analysis. See id. at 2160 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part); id. at 2165-69
(O'Connor, J., joined by Brennan & Marshall, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); id. at 2169 (White, J., dissenting).
15. 452 U.S. 640 (1981). My firm was counsel for the plaintiffs in their successful appeal
to the Minnesota Supreme Court, 299 N.W.2d 79 (Minn. 1980). After certiorari was granted,
Professor Laurence H. Tribe became counsel of record, with my firm continuing on the

brief.
16. Judge Kaufman's opinion for the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Barber, 650 F.2d 430 (2d Cir.
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Using the ordinary Sherbert v. Verner17 free exercise analysis,
the Minnesota Supreme Court had little difficulty concluding that
the "booth rule" could not constitutionally be applied to the
Krishnas' practice of sankirtan. In the United States Supreme
Court, however, the Krishnas grounded their claim on the free
speech clause, under which the activities involved in sankirtanalso
were protected and under which they would have been protected
entirely apart from their religious motivation and content. The
Court, however, went out of its way to emphasize that, regardless
of any potential special religious compulsion, religious organizations cannot achieve what the Court called "rights to communicate, distribute, and solicit superior to those of other organizations
having social, political, or other ideological messages to proselytize.""8 In the Court's view, therefore, the free speech clause can
and does place a heavy lid on what religious expression will be protected by the Constitution. 19
A third aspect of the speech-religion interplay is exemplified by
Widmar v. Vincent, 20 in which a student religious organization at
the University of Missouri at Kansas City sought access to a university meeting room for purposes of "prayer, hymns, Bible commentary, and discussion of religious views and experiences. '21 The
students were denied access pursuant to a policy prohibiting the
use of university facilities "for purposes of religious worship or religious teaching. '22 Like Heffron, the case began as a challenge to
the rule under both free exercise and free speech grounds and
eventually narrowed to the latter.

1981), also a case in which my firm represented the plaintiffs, provides a detailed and sensitive discussion of the theological bases and legal implications of the practice of sankirtan.
17. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). The Court in Sherbert held that the state needed to demonstrate
a compelling state interest in order to overcome the burden on free exercise of religion. Id.
at 406.
18. 452 U.S. at 652-53.
19. In my view, it is a failure of free exercise theory for a restriction applied to speech
that is carried out under sincere religious compulsion not to be given stricter scrutiny than

might otherwise be the case. I am hopeful, particularly given that the issue was not really
tested in Heffron, that the Court may come to reexamine this point.
20. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
21. Id. at 265 n.2.
22. Id. at 265 (footnote omitted).
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In holding that the university policy constituted forbidden content discrimination under the free speech clause, the Court first
had to conclude that the religious services the plaintiff group had
in mind constituted speech. Indeed, it remarked, almost offhandedly, that religious worship isa form "of speech and association
2' 3
protected by the First Amendment.
While the Court's conclusion may be unexceptionable, it also
may portend a significant shift in free exercise jurisprudence. Justice White noted in dissent that if "religious worship qua speech is
not different from any other variety of protected speech," then
"the Religion Clauses would be emptied of any independent meaning in circumstances in which religious practice took the form of
speech. '24 Given that "speech" includes many forms of behavior
other than the spoken or written word, so long as they can be said
to possess a modicum of communicative content-the display of
symbolic objects; 25 the exhibition of works of art;21 singing; 27 dancing;2s and, of course, mere silence 29-one easily can imagine the
vast array of religious practices that the free speech clause may
turn out to encompass. Heffron and Widmar demonstrate that the
Court will by no means shy away from looking at the exercise of
religion through a free speech lens.
I find Dean Choper's treatment of the free exercise case quite
interesting, but also somewhat puzzling. In his view, Wisconsin v.
Yoder ° was right and Sherbert v. Verner3 1 was wrong.32 In support
of the first conclusion, he writes that "[p]eople were not lining up
to join the Old Order Amish so they could get their children out of
school before the age of sixteen," and that, "[i]n the absence of

23. Id. at 269.
24. Id. at 285 (White, J., dissenting).
25. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974) (peace symbol affixed to American flag).
26. Sefick v. City of Chicago, 485 F. Supp. 644 (N.D. Ill. 1979) ("tableau" sculpture of
Mayor and Mrs. Bilandic).
27. Goldstein v. Town of Nantucket, 477 F. Supp. 606 (D. Mass. 1979) (itinerant folk
singing by self-styled "Troubadour of Nantucket").
28. Salem Inn, Inc. v. Frank, 501 F.2d 18 (2d Cir. 1974) (topless dancing), aff'd in part,
reu'd in part sub nom. Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922 (1975).
29. Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966) (silent sit-in in public library).
30. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
31. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
32. Choper, supra note 1, at 948-50.
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proof of this kind, the exemption posed no danger to religious liberty, even though it served a religious purpose.""3 As for Sherbert,
he points out that the exemption was granted only on a religious
basis; Sherbert's claim would have failed had her refusal to work
on Saturdays been the result of a purely secular commitment to
the family. Thus, Dean Choper concludes, "[t]he Court granted an
'3 4
exemption in Sherbet for religion alone.
I doubt strongly, however, that the years since 1963 have seen
the ranks of the Seventh Day Adventists swell with those looking
for easy Monday-to-Friday jobs. Moreover, I certainly take it that
Dean Choper would not disagree with the observation that Yoder,
too, would not have been decided as it was had the parents' claim
'35
openly been founded "just" on ethnic tradition, not on "religion.
Arguing against the result in Sherbert,Dean Choper asserts that
"for government to give a taxpayer's money to religion . . . is a
pristine violation of the establishment clause," and that he "cannot
distinguish the payment of funds to Sherbert from the grant of a
million dollars to support the the Presbyterian Church."3 6 First,
from a practical standpoint, things are not all that pristine to begin with. I am not aware that anyone has argued seriously that
churches should not be provided with such humdrum, but necessary and expensive, government services as sanitation and fire and
police protection. Churches' tax-exempt status constitutes even
greater and more direct enforced public financial support, a notion

33. Id. at 948.
34. Id. at 949.
35. Indeed, exactly how "religious" the convictions of the Amish parents were in Yoder is
unclear to me. Many insular ethnic groups exist that would prefer to keep their children out
of the public schools to prevent them from being seduced by the mainstream of secular
culture. The "how do you keep 'em down on the farm" syndrome has been particularly
impressed on me recently as a result of my firm's work with members of the Gypsy or, more
properly, the Romani community. See Spiritual Psychic Science Church of Truth v. City of
Azusa, 39 Cal. 3d 501, 703 P.2d 1119, 217 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1985) (holding fortune telling to be
protected speech under the California Constitution). The issue raises, as Justice Douglas
perceived, serious questions as to what happens to the rights of the children who, by their
parents' choice and the acquiescence of the state through the nation's highest judicial body,
are kept out of school. In a sense, in Yoder the Court "established" the Old Amish faith for
these children, whose ability to leave that faith and community was-for lack of the minimal credential of a high school or trade school diploma-sharply limited were they to contemplate employment outside the agricultural society of their parents.
36. Choper, supra note 1, at 949.
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blessed by the Supreme Court in Walz v. Tax Commission. 7 I
must add, though, that I assume Dean Choper believes Walz to
have been wrongly decided.
Beyond this, however, surely a distinction can be drawn between
a judicial decision to preserve and implement an individual freedom granted explicitly by the Bill of Rights that may result in a
marginal depletion of the government treasury and an outright
grant of funds by the legislative and executive branches to a religious organization, for reasons, one assumes, of political convenience. Apart from the difference between a payment to an individual for unemployment compensation on the one hand and a
payment to a church organization for furtherance of its religious
mission on the other, in a situation such as Sherbert the government has not made a conscious choice to support any particular
religion, but, as is sometimes said, merely has accommodated the
exercise of religion by its citizens, a right protected by the Constitution. A direct grant to the Presbyterian Church would seem to be
in a different category.
The dialectic of free exercise and anti-establishmentarianism
cannot be eliminated entirely from constitutional decisionmaking.
The tension, the contradiction, or whatever one chooses to call it,
is inherent in the history, the text, and the application of the first
amendment. The undeniable necessity of drawing lines, however,
does not entail that any given line derives from absolute truth.
Dean Choper's line in Sherbert is defensible, but so is Justice
Brennan's. We must subsist with that ambiguity.
A word, finally, about Larson v. Valente,38 a case Dean Choper
treats in some detail, is appropriate. Because my firm initiated the
case and litigated it through the Supreme Court stage-a point at
which we were delighted to be joined by Professor Stone, whose
contribution to the cause was immeasurable-I find it difficult to
be entirely objective about it, but for the same reason find it
equally difficult to resist saying something. Dean Choper would
prefer to view Larson as a free exercise rather than an establishment case. It was indeed fortuitous that the case turned out the
way that it did.

37. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
38. 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
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In Larson, the Minnesota Attorney General's office had
threatened the Unification Church with enforcement of a recently
enacted, and onerous, amendment to the State's charitable solicitations law. A complaint and motion for preliminary injunction were
quickly put together, challenging the constitutionality of the statute on as many grounds as possible. The establishment clause theory, for which not a great deal of direct precedent was available,
was devised at the last minute and was far from being the centerpiece of the case as presented initially.
A number of these issues were discussed when Magistrate-now
Judge-Robert Renner recommended issuance of the preliminary
injunction. The State's litigation tactics thereafter obliged us to
move ahead quickly with a motion for summary judgment, which,
again, encompassed a wide spectrum of claims. In his recommendation that, essentially, the motion be granted, Magistrate Renner,
to our considerable surprise, narrowed the case down to the novel
establishment clause theory. As a result, it was that issue
alone-although we continued to try to reassert the others-that
was considered on appeal by both the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit and the United States Supreme Court.
That being so, although I think the case could have been decided
along the free exercise lines that Dean Choper suggests, I am not
sure that the Court was necessarily wrong in the path it did
choose. I concur readily in Dean Choper's observation that a law
that "expressly deal[s] with the subject of religion, and [results] in
favoring some and disfavoring others" should be "as vulnerable...
as a general, neutral law that says nothing about religion but that
happens to have an adverse impact on some faiths."3' 9 It does not
follow inexorably, however, that the two cases must be subsumed
in the same analytical framework, especially when, as in Larson,
the law does more than "result" in disparate treatment of
churches, but has such treatment as its explicit raison d'atre. This
kind of law, I believe, does implicate basic establishment clause, as
well as free exercise, values, regardless of whether it fits neatly into
the "three-part test." That test, after all, is not the clause itself.
I do not believe this result would be disturbed even if, as Dean
Choper suggests, the Court applied an improperly lenient test in

39. Choper, supra note 1, at 959-60.
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its prior decision in Gillette v. United States.40 I happen to agree
that it did, and I am pleased to see that Dean Choper believes that
"[t]he Gillette doctrine . . .effectively has been abandoned."41 I
hope he is right, but in any event the fact that a misguided test
was applied in Gillette under the establishment clause does not
mean necessarily that the Court was wrong to apply the establishment clause in the first instance.
In conclusion, I would like to thank Dean Choper because, without his creative energy, we would not have had the opportunity to
think about the interesting questions he raises. It is a pleasure for
me to be set free from the adversary system for a change, and to
share opinions without worrying about how they might affect a
particular client. In my imagination I think of law professors as
being free to seek the truth, while we practicing lawyers find that
for our clients the truth is sometimes-to put it delicately-inconvenient. This Symposium has given me the opportunity to join for once in a higher good: the search for the path to
individual liberty for all.

40. 401 U.S. 437 (1971).
41. Choper, supra note 1, at 961.

